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Abstract: 
The EU’s dependence upon exchanges with organised civil society as a proxy for 
popular participation makes its procedures for participatory governance critical for 
input legitimacy.  The most recent of these is the European Transparency 
Initiative.  The paper examines the development of the lobby regulation element 
of the ETI, the detail of its operation, and the concepts upon which it is founded, 
in order to consider its potential to contribute to wider goals of participatory 
legitimacy.  The main energies devoted to creating the initiative were spent in the 
struggle to get it established, with relatively less attention given to the 
implications of operational issues involved in registration.  Whilst transparency is 
the main focus, a legacy of predecessor initiatives on interest group 
representativeness, primarily spatial in concern, remain embedded in the scheme, 
which place limitations on advocacy based groups. An alternative regulatory 
device to representativeness is that of accountability, which can be 
accommodated within the EU’s existing framework of liberal democracy with 
elements of deliberative overtones, and of which traces can be found in the Code 
of Conduct associated to the registration scheme. 
 
Keywords: European Transparency Initiative; lobby regulation; interest group 
representativeness; accountability; liberal and deliberative democracy.
“This is a post-peer-review, pre-copyedit version of an article published in Comparative 
European Politics. The definitive publisher-authenticated version Justin Greenwood (2011) 'The 
lobby regulation element of the European Transparency Initiative: between liberal and deliberative 
models of democracy', Comparative European Politics, 9, 3, pp317-343 doi:10.1057/cep.2010.18 is 
available online at: http://www.palgrave-journals.com/cep/journal/v9/n3/index.html 
©Justin Greenwood 
 2 
 
What is the potential of the lobby regulation element of the European 
Transparency Initiative (ETI) to contribute to wider goals of participatory based 
legitimacy?  To answer this question requires analysis of where the initiative 
came from, the detail of its operation, and the concepts upon which key 
operational elements are founded or embedded. 
 
The European Transparency Initiative, announced by European Commission 
vice-President Kallas in 2005, is founded on the premise that transparency is a 
pre-condition for popular legitimacy.  It has core components covering financial 
transparency for EU funding recipients, the ethical behaviour of EU officials, and 
lobby regulation (Cini, 2008).  Thus, the principle focus of lobby regulation is 
transparency.  In sum, the lobby regulation element, opened in 2008, involves 
incentivised voluntary registration to a public web database involving disclosure 
for organisations (other than public authorities) which seek to influence public 
policy.  The key transparency elements involve disclosure elements surrounding: 
organisational contact etc details; interest categorisation; who is represented; 
mission/interest areas; spending on interest representation; and, for NGOs and 
think-tanks, budget and sources of funding.  Entry is conditional upon signing up 
to an associated code of conduct.  The European Parliament has for some time 
had a different registration system for individuals, with a web based listing.  The 
two institutions have agreed a common register effective from June 2011, with 
pooled incentive systems to encourage registrations. 
 
 
The origin of the ETI lobby regulation scheme 
 
The regulatory nature of policy making, where costs are distributed to specific 
interest constituencies (Lowi, 1964; Wilson, 1995), make much of the EU’s 
underlying politics centred around interest groups. The functions of the European 
Commission make it the principal interlocutor with organised interests, and thus 
the key architect of the structures in which interest groups participate.  A key 
distinguishing feature of the Commission system is that its procedural democracy 
regime is based on the premise that organised civil society – as proxies in the 
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face of a lack of engagement for wider civil society – are the key agents likely to 
operationalise it.  The regime is primarily based on pluralist principles in which a 
wide-ranging landscape of interest groups has been deliberately developed to 
create a series of checks and balances and countervailing forces, on each-other 
and as accountability agents acting on EU institutions.  A series of accompanying 
measures empower agents of organised civil society, such as funding for 
(primarily) citizen interests, and transparency measures such as the 2001 Access 
to Documents Regulation1
 
 which enable interests to address asymmetries of 
information with EU institutions and eachother.  
In the public justificatory rhetoric of its movers, the European Transparency 
Initiative has from the outset been placed in the policy frame of participatory 
legitimacy.  The press release announcing the adoption of the ETI by the 
European Commission was headed ‘Greater transparency in EU affairs will 
strengthen legitimacy’ (European Commission, 2006a).  Kallas drew explicitly 
upon the participatory democracy frame as justification on the day he announced 
the initiative: 
 
 
‘Transparency is needed to gain the trust of the public.  Political institutions 
cannot perform without public confidence… legitimacy is only ensured when 
political institutions are exposed to transparency, when people know that 
what they see is what they get’ (Kallas, 2005, p.4). 
 
The lobby regulation element reads as the latest measure in a tradition mostly 
developed by the 2001 White Paper of Governance of building a recognisable 
procedural framework of liberal democracy.  Yet the emphasis upon transparency 
is a shift from (though not an abandonment of) the regulatory focus about the 
representativeness of interest groups contained in the White Paper on 
Governance (Smismans, 2009; Kohler Koch, 2010).  Thus, in the initial Kallas 
speech  
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‘Lobbyists can have considerable influence on legislation…but their 
transparency is too deficient in comparison to the impact of their activities’ 
(p.6)” 
 
while the Green Paper launching the ETI reasoned: 
 
‘External scrutiny can act as a deterrent against improper forms of lobbying. 
Transparency measures can provide information about who is engaged in 
lobbying activities and the positions they take when lobbying the European 
institutions’ (European Commission, 2006b, p.6). 
 
Thus, the explicit connection made to participatory legitimacy went along the 
lines that: if the EU system is dependent upon its exchanges with organised civil 
society for democratic legitimacy, so wider civil society must be assured as to the 
probity of those exchanges.  In this frame, the potential negative externalities of 
engaging with organised civil society therefore need to be addressed, of which 
transparency related elements are a recognisable step.  The ETI therefore has a 
web based search instrument providing for public transparency of grant holders, 
and a lobby regulation element.   
 
Seen in these terms, the ETI is an incremental progression within a 
recognisable line of inheritance.  Yet there is another context which helps explain 
key deficits in its conceptualisation and operation, and which may ultimately 
serve to limit its democratic legitimacy potential.  This is because the principal 
efforts devoted to it were those invested more in the political establishment of the 
scheme than in the detail of its operation.   
 
The political establishment of the scheme fits Kingdon’s (1984) agenda setting 
model, in which an a-priori solution is attached to a problem by a policy 
entrepreneur drawing on the support of a key stakeholder constituency.  A leader 
from an anti-globalisation ’alternatives’ organisation, then recently active on the 
Brussels scene, took the opportunity presented by a new Commission to write to 
President Barroso in October 2004 seeking a comprehensive lobby regulation 
scheme similar in kind to that in operation in the United States.  The activist 
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received a reply in November 2004 from the Secretariat General, stating that the 
Commission saw no need to change its present arrangements, based around self-
regulation for lobbyists and codes of conduct for officials.2  He tried his luck 
elsewhere, sending a similar letter to the European Commission vice-Presidents 
on 18 January 2005.  One of these ‘hit the spot’ with a new Commissioner 
seeking to agenda-set his term of office at a very early stage; Cini concludes that 
“the interest group regulation component of the ETI came directly from 
(the)...letter” (Cini, 2008, p.752).  
 
Commissioner Kallas’s portfolio embraced administrative affairs, and his 
political career was developed in Estonia, a country with a substantial recent 
tradition of administrative reform based around transparency.  He invited the 
author of the January 18 letter, Erik Wesselius of the Corporate Europe 
Observatory (CEO), to a meeting in February 2005, which was also attended by 
Kallas’s Deputy Head of Cabinet, Kristian Schmidt (who was to take on political 
responsibility for helping to develop the dossier), to discuss the idea.  In March 
2005 Kallas announced the European Transparency Initiative in a keynote speech 
in Nottingham, UK.  Chabanet records that  
 
‘the speech…basically used the…demands, concerns and alarmist, not to say 
vehement, tone” of the campaigners’ (Chabanet, 2007, p.33).  
 
The speech made explicit reference to ’15,000 lobbyists,’ a figure mentioned in 
the advocacy letter he had received from CEO.3 Whereas the contents and 
announcements of the speech seemed to take just about everyone by surprise, 
Wesselius was early off the mark in the press the following morning in greeting 
the initiative as ‘good news for democracy.’4  In July 2005 Commissioner Kallas 
attended the launch event of ALTER-EU (Alliance for Lobbying Transparency and 
Ethics Regulation) as a keynote speaker, sitting alongside Wesselius, whose 
organisation had played a key part5
 
 in the formation of the ALTER-EU coalition.  
An ALTER-EU steering committee member of the time later reflected that  
“Kallas has been receptive to the ideas of ALTER-EU from its very launch.”6 
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Similarly, Balme and Chabanet reflect that 
 
‘since late 2004 Alter-EU has set up a precise programme which is closely 
drawn upon by the Commission for its thinking’ (Balme and Chabanet, 
2007, p.3).  
 
The ETI initiative as a whole was formally launched by the Commission in 
November 2005, following its announcement for internal discussion in May 2005.  
The relationship between ALTER-EU and the Cabinet of Commissioner Kallas 
continued through to 2007, including a further meeting (May)7
 
, and reflected in a 
statement in an ALTER-EU brochure of around the same time that it had ‘built a 
confident working relationship with key EU officials, including Commissioner 
Kallas’.8  
Testimony to this working relationship is a trail of (one-time public domain) e-
mails exchanged in 2007 between the two parties, of which the single most 
frequent exchanges are between Wesselius and Schmidt.  This correspondence 
was among 172 separate entries which appeared on the Commission’s web 
pages9
 
 from 2008-2010, initially introduced by a dedicated web link on the ETI 
pages, linking to a register of correspondence, with each register entry 
hyperlinked to the correspondence item itself.  The penultimate correspondence 
item related to an Access to Documents request submitted by Wesselius in April 
2008 seeking all correspondence exchanges with Commissioner Kallas/his Cabinet 
and ‘outside lobbyists’ on the ETI.    The episode seems to have triggered the 
disclosure of correspondence on the Commission web pages, and seemingly 
marked the end of the apparently harmonious working relationship with Cabinet 
Kallas on the lobby regulation element of the ETI evident in the 2007 
correspondence.   
In sum, the correspondence includes: mutual supply of, and request for, 
materials ahead of speeches by Commissioner Kallas; briefings and advice 
seeking on the positions of other stakeholders; holiday tales, and the exchange of 
‘smiley’ emoticons denoting shared understandings between correspondents on 
first name terms; reassurances of support; an ‘in-confidence’ notation; and 
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support for the Kallas team position not to undertake an impact assessment on 
the ETI in line with standard procedures for new proposals, a persistent line of 
criticism by commercial public affairs practitioners.10 
 
Nonetheless, Cabinet Kallas and ALTER-EU did take a different view about the 
means to achieve the regulatory goals, particularly (but not only) about the issue 
of voluntary versus mandatory registration.  This became increasingly evident 
from 2008 onwards in the tone of critical press statements issued by ALTER-EU, 
particularly about the voluntary nature of the scheme.  The ETI continues a 
tradition adopted by the European Parliament’s earlier scheme of avoiding 
definitional traps as to what constitutes ‘lobbying’ by relying instead on a system 
of incentives.  The ETI incentives involved: consultation alerts matching the 
registrant’s identification of interest areas; responses to consultation exercises 
received from non-registrants would be given the same weight as that of a 
private individual, rather than a collective body; and that Commission officials 
meeting with non-registrant’s are asked to invite the organisation to register, and 
where the proposed meeting did not involve consultation covered by Treaty 
provisions, may decide to decline it.  In practice these incentives have been 
somewhat weak. Upcoming consultations are already announced in advance in 
public, assigning weighting to consultation responses is fraught with practical 
difficulty, and there is highly uneven implementation within the Commission of 
the ‘invitation to register’ guidance.  There are some notable absences of players 
active on the Brussels scene in the register11
 
.  Consequently, when the 
Commission register is merged with that of the Parliament in 2011 the additional 
incentive used for sometime by the Parliament will be added.  This involves the 
issue of a twelve month building entry pass, rather than the alternative of a day 
pass issued to a member of the public attached to a specific MEP host.  This will 
preserve the ‘voluntary’ approach and thus consistent with the wish to avoid 
creating a formal system of accreditation. Kallas asserted that   
“I have been very attentive to this danger of giving special privileges to an 
accredited group of lobbyists. There will be no accreditation.” (Kallas, 2007, 
p.4) 
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For CEO, the reality of a political system responsive to its requests did not 
altogether chime with its messages of an EU agenda driven by business demands.  
A related notable observation is that an advocacy organisation which had initially 
positioned itself as an ‘outsider’  ‘think tank’12 based outside Brussels (possibly 
better encapsulated with origins as part of a broader anti-globalisaton social 
movement) had itself become institutionalised in the Brussels circuit of interest 
groups by its immersion in the ETI campaign, with an established niche for 
lobbying about lobbying, later registering in the NGO category of the ETI 
database and finding a shared office facility in Brussels.  This general process of 
institutionalisation over time is well noted in the literature, whether the starting 
point was as a social movement (Rawcliffe, 1998), an interest group, (Jordan and 
Halpin, 2003), or a mix of strategies (Wilson, 1995). 
 
The strategic use by political institutions of allies in organised civil society to 
achieve policy ends is likewise unremarkable.  Taking a voluntary approach to the 
scheme meant that the introduction of the initiative would need the support of 
the various constituencies upon whom the measure was directed.  Kallas used a 
variety of strategies to do this, requiring careful positioning in which his deputy 
Head of Cabinet, Schmidt, appears to have been instrumental.   Opposition from 
segments of the wider ‘public affairs’ community was anticipated.  To these, 
Kallas and Schmidt used a variety of approaches, including: meetings with 
targeted organisations; persuasion framed in public discourse of transparency 
and democratic legitimacy, and that the measures were not intended to be either 
‘anti-business’ nor indeed ‘anti-lobbying’ but rather in the interests of all, not 
least as a measure to prevent a future ‘scandal’ likely to tarnish all13; tactics of 
divide and rule between and within key types of stakeholders; and, where 
necessary, confrontation.  A key component of the latter approach was to use 
ALTER-EU, both as a ‘Rottweiler’ against the most entrenched opponents, and as 
a means to bring the wider NGO community on board.  All of these tactics are 
established mechanisms of everyday political manoeuvring.  The key point is that 
they highlight how the principal energies devoted into the scheme were primarily 
spent on building political support for its establishment.  There was less time for a 
Commissioner (who had other demanding portfolios) to spend on the detail of the 
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operation of the scheme.  This has resulted in a number of ‘rough edges’ in the 
detailed operation of the ETI, which carry consequences of varying degrees of 
significance. 
 
 
Operating the lobby regulation element of the ETI 
 
Once the scheme was launched in June 2008, a mutual preoccupation of both the 
media and Kallas/Schmidt was with the ‘headline’ figure of the number of 
registrations.  This is because of the citation by Kallas at the 2005 announcement 
of the scheme that ‘around 2,600 interest groups have a permanent office in the 
capital of Europe’ (Kallas, 2005, p.5), which subsequently became used as a 
(crude) yardstick of success for the registration scheme by various media.  
Seemingly less important were the type of organisations signing up to it, of which 
a significant number are of interests not organised at EU level, nor primarily 
addressed to the EU level.  In the most populated category,  ‘professional 
associations’, embracing business/trade associations, just over one third of 
entries (310/850)14 are of associations organised at EU level, with most entries 
constituted by national, and sub-national, associations.  In other categories there 
are small service enterprises in far-flung provinces of the EU whose entries take 
the opportunity of free advertising space, as well as organisations from third 
countries where links to EU interest representation can only be highly tenuous, 
such as a University in Peru.  There have also been organisations registering 
because they believed that their chances of grant funding would be increased15
 
, 
and entries of non-existent organisations claiming an annual lobbying spend of 
€250 million, attributed to the work of a ‘prankster’.16   
As the quirkiness of entries suggests, there are few Commission resources 
devoted to monitoring entries.  Since the ‘prankster’ entries attracted media 
attention, the Commission has allocated part of the time of one member of staff 
to scrutinising the worst excesses.  However, less prominent infractions, such as 
the failure to enter information on funding, seemingly goes without Commission 
initiated intervention. Rather, the database relies on the principle of checks and 
balances.  CEO scrutinises the detail of new entries, and together with its key 
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alliance partners launches strategic complaints.  One of these, filed by Friends of 
the Earth Europe, concerned the lobbying spend entry for the European Chemical 
Industry Association (CEFIC) for 2007, which clearly constituted a fraction of the 
costs of political representation incurred by the organisation.17
 
  CEFIC’s entry of 
€50,000 followed a template of many early registrants, resulting from a lack of 
detailed guidance for how the expenditure should be calculated.  Thus, the 
declarations of annual expenditure for representing interests to the EU institutions 
range from zero to €1.3 million, while some organisations claim to be spending 
more in doing so than the entire organisational budget they declare.  Some 
registered organisations simply do not respond to the question about spending on 
interest representation to EU institutions.  There are EU business associations 
registered in categories18 other than the one designed for them. 
There has been persistent criticism of lack of attention to detail in the scheme 
from the outset, with Kallas and his Cabinet extremely reluctant to become drawn 
into detailed questions of operationalisation.  For instance, the advice from 
Schmidt to requests for clarification as to how the expenditure on lobbying the EU 
institutions should be calculated was to make a ‘good faith estimate’ (Hood, 
2009)19
 
, resulting in large variations in declaration. The key point is that Kallas 
and his cabinet were less interested in operational questions than in the 
establishment of the scheme, assessed most importantly for them in the number 
of registrations attracted.  For one commentator, Kallas had been seeking to 
‘maximise his legacy and reputation’ before changing his portfolio of 
responsibilities in-between the Barroso 1 and 2 Commissions.20  Most effort was 
devoted to drawing attention to pockets of poor registration rates, such as law 
firms and think tanks, and to ‘naming and shaming’ high profile absentees when 
Schmidt and Kallas made public speeches. 
The predecessor public web database of interest groups was CONECCS 
(Consultation, the European Commission and Civil Society).  CONECCS started life 
as a ‘telephone directory’ of groups for use by the Commission services so as to 
assist different departments with knowing who the relevant groups were for 
consultation.  Thus, non-inclusion on the database carried consequences.  A 
highly significant rule was that access to the database required a prior declaration 
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that the organisation had members in at least 3 member, or candidate member, 
states.  This threshold defined a concept notably pursued in the White Paper on 
Governance that groups able to furnish guarantees on representativity might 
enjoy privileged partnerships with the Commission: 
 
‘With better involvement comes greater responsibility.  Civil society must 
itself follow the principles of good governance, which include accountability 
and openness.  The Commission intends to establish a comprehensive on-
line database with details of civil society organisations active at European 
level, which should act as a catalyst to improve their internal organisation.’ 
(European Commission, 2001, p.15) 
 
‘Creating a culture of consultation ...should be underpinned by a code of 
conduct that sets minimum standards...These standards should improve the 
representativity of civil society organisations and structure their debate with 
the Institutions.’ (op. cit., p.17) 
 
‘In some policy sectors, where consultative practices are already well 
established, the Commission could develop more extensive partnership 
arrangements.  On the Commission’s part, this will entail a commitment for 
additional consultations compared to the minimum standards.  In return, 
the arrangements will prompt civil society organisations to tighten up their 
internal structures, furnish guarantees of openness and representativity, 
and prove their capacity to relay information or lead debates in the Member 
States’ (ibid.p.17). 
   
 
Predictably, ‘more extensive partnership arrangements’ for some was 
supported by civil society organisations well capable of playing this game, i.e. 
‘who’ rather than ‘what’ organisations with a geographic spread of members. The 
concept has been actively pursued by civil society organisations whose position at 
the top of the tree would thus be elevated.  The lead organisation in the social 
field, the Platform of European Social NGOs (‘Social Platform’), has frequently 
asserted a preference for an accreditation system (based on representativeness), 
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despite consistent policy statements from the Commission that there should be 
no such system21
 
 (European Social Platform, 2000; Platform of European Social 
NGOs, 2001; Cullen, 2005).  Other EU civic organisations with rival claims to 
leadership and which are more based around advocacy than geographic 
membership, such as the European Citizen Action Service, and Permanent Forum 
of Civil Society, have consistently argued against the use of representativeness or 
accredited criteria.22  Organisations like Statewatch complained that the 
CONECCS rule excluded them from the database, and therefore restricted their 
institutional access (Friedrich, 2006; Kendall, Will and Brandsen, 2009).   
Whilst there were no enforcement procedures during the period when 
CONECCS was in operation which prevented dialogue between the Commission 
services and non-registered organisations (and in practice would not have had an 
impact upon already well recognised NGOs in the ‘Brussels circuit’), the denial of 
access would have restricted knowledge about lesser known potential consultation 
partners.  This reflects a secondary strand of worries about interest groups 
beyond geographic representativeness, about the ‘professionalisation’ of Brussels 
based groups, i.e. the extent of their roots to civil society: 
 
‘ the issue of representativeness at European level should not be used as the 
only criterion when assessing the relevance or quality of comments.  The 
Commission will avoid consultation processes which could give the impression 
that ‘Brussels is only talking to Brussels’ as one person put it.’   
(European Commission, 2002a, pp. 11/12) 
 
The transition from CONECCS to the ETI seems to have softened the position 
on both geographic and constituency representativeness, but not altogether 
removed it.  Gone is the insistence on membership threshold as a pre-condition 
for entry, although this can be linked to the eagerness of the ETI movers to 
maximise registrations.  Instead, the focus is upon using transparency as an 
exposure device as a means to address the issues.  NGOs are asked to list their 
members, a requirement which is not made of other categories of entrants such 
as business associations, who are apparently assumed to have the desired quality 
of representativeness.  There is no trace of this principle being developed further, 
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since the ETI remains in the ‘establishment’ phase, with the emphasis upon 
stronger incentives to sign up. 
 
Beyond this, one clause contained in the Code of Conduct linked to ETI 
registration23
 
 is set apart in terms of significance from the anodyne content such 
codes tend to carry.  Clause 4 of the code states that 
 ‘interest representatives shall always ensure that, to the best of their 
knowledge, information which they provide is unbiased, up-to-date, complete 
and not misleading.’24   
 
This carries overtones of public accountability, recognising that stakeholders 
who become institutionalised policy participants (rather than simple public 
advocates) carry wider responsibilities.  This principle is also reflected in the 
International NGO charter (recently re-branded as the ‘International NGO 
Accountability Charter’25), and in some of the ‘Compact’ codes to be found at 
member state level setting standards for, and agreed by, the consultative 
partners26.  The One World Trust has identified 309 civil society self-regulatory 
initiatives (Murgado, 2010), and for most of these accountability norms feature as 
a standard element27
 
.    
Conclusion: beyond representativeness, towards accountability 
 
Norms of ‘geographic representativeness’ only embrace one type of interest 
group organisation, and if linked to access criteria or consultation status by 
regulatory devices would limit participation by advocacy based NGOs, and thus 
participatory legitimacy.  The continued legacy of geographic representativeness 
in the lobby regulation scheme, whilst not operationalised as an access criteria 
but rather as a transparency device for others to pass judgement on, still carries 
implied consequences.  The ETI has shifted emphasis from ‘hard’ 
representativeness to ‘softer’ transparency, but also seems to have ‘copied and 
pasted’ the cruder legacy agenda for groups of geographic representativeness 
dating back to the White Paper on Governance, only removing the use of it as 
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access criteria (as per the predecessor CONECCS database) in deference to the 
greater need to attract registrations.   
 
For Pitkin, whilst different norms of representativeness can be attached to 
different categories of representatives, ultimately representation always involves 
a disjuncture between the represented and the representative (Pitkin, 1967).  At 
one end of Pitkin’s spectrum, closely controlled ‘mandated delegates’ in 
membership organisations involve issues of responsiveness and sanction, while at 
the other pole of Pitkin’s categories, substantive representation (the 
representative as trustee, acting for others in the interests of others) – is not 
necessarily democratic (Kohler Koch, 2010).  This latter trustee category is 
however well fitted to organisations advocating for a cause (such as prison 
conditions, the environment for future generations, animal welfare, etc) for which 
the ‘members’ are not the core reference point.  Where advocates ‘cross the 
boundary’ and become agents of policy participation, so issues of accountability 
do arise to those upon whom such policies impact.  Bovens defines accountability 
as  
 
‘a relationship between an actor and a forum, in which the actor has an 
obligation to explain and to justify his or her conduct, the forum can pose 
questions and pass judgement, and the actor may face consequences’ 
(Bovens, 2007, p.447). 
 
Whilst this definition has recently attracted currency, a key question in 
operationalising it is to meet the challenge of defining who the ‘forum’ is.  
Inevitably, the forum is diversely constituted, and no less so where organised civil 
society is a proxy for civil society.  The ability to pose questions and pass 
judgement on organisations in this context resides in political institutions, in other 
civil society organisations, and among wider civil society.  The same applies to 
sanctions, ranging from various degree of exclusion and isolation.  The challenge 
is to develop these concepts of accountability for use as regulatory devices.  In 
the 2006 ETI Green Paper, accountability was a form of transparency: 
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‘Openness and accountability are important principles for the conduct of 
organisations when they are seeking to contribute to EU policy development.  
It must be apparent which interests they represent, and how inclusive that 
representation is’ (European Commission, 2006, p.7). 
 
 The Green Paper also proposed developing the accountability mechanism 
through sanction via an external monitoring body (European Commission, 2006), 
although the follow up Communication argued against this on the basis that it 
would itself blur the Commission’s own accountability for its relations with 
representatives of outside interests (European Commission, 2007).  However, in 
the Code of Conduct, finalised in 2008, the concept of accountability developed 
beyond the limited notion of transparency (through which others have the 
capacity to reach a judgement), by the inclusion of the clause on evidence based 
standards.  This standard is a pre-requisite for a participatory system which 
aspires to deliberative norms of public reasoning as a basis for policy 
development.  Whilst the EU is no ‘deliberative democracy’, its liberal democracy 
is founded upon checks and balances in which impact assessments are first 
placed in the public domain by political institutions for open debate.  These then 
becomes the public battleground between protagonists, as they ultimately inform 
the premises on which policy is based.  From these public consultations, the 
European Commission is supposed to make policy choices on the basis of public 
reasoning.   
 
EU liberal democracy procedures thus embrace key processes of external 
review and mediation through public debate, which carry overtones of public 
deliberation.  Liberal democracy places more demands upon groups than do 
deliberative democracy norms, in that the latter has a more relaxed focus upon 
ensuring diverse contributions to public debate through ensuring a teeming 
population of groups, and their contribution to public reasoning (Kohler Koch, 
2010); thus, demands for group representativeness and accountability might 
restrict the flow of these elements.  Thus, liberal democracy and deliberative 
democracy represent different points on the regulatory spectrum, with the latter 
occupying a more laissez-faire perspective.  The European Commission system is 
somewhere in between these points.  It has no system of accreditation, yet the 
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concerns it has about groups means that it is not laissez-faire.  It worries more 
about representativeness, but a little about diversity, as reflected in the European 
Commission’s 2002 Communication on Consultation: 
 
Moreover, minority views can also form an essential dimension of open 
discourse on policies.  On the other hand, it is important for the Commission to 
consider how representative views are when taking a political decision 
following a consultation process’ (European Commission, 2002, pp. 12). 
 
The Commission system has more emphasis upon procedural participation 
than it does upon public reasoning, though its procedures are oriented towards 
delivery of public reasoning through impact assessments etc.  Whilst the role of 
groups in traditions of liberal and deliberative democracy can be difficult to 
reconcile (Kohler Koch, 2010; citing Steffek and Ferretti, 2010 – ‘watchdogs don’t 
deliberate’), they can also be complementary.  The approach indicated here – to 
suppress the pursuit of geographic representativeness in favour of developing 
norms of accountability based upon standards of behaviour in public discourse - is 
entirely consistent with a system founded upon liberal democracy, but with 
deliberative elements. The requirement upon organised civil society contained in 
clause 4 of the ETI lobby registration scheme Code of Conduct, to ensure that 
information is unbiased, up-to-date, complete and not misleading, is deliberative 
in effect, and accountability oriented.  The potential of the lobby regulation 
element of the European Transparency Initiative (ETI) to contribute to wider 
goals of participatory based legitimacy seem to depend partly upon the shift from 
representativeness, to accountability based criteria. 
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Appendix: List of correspondence with Cabinet Kallas relating to the 
Commission’s register of interest representatives. 
 
Date From To Subject 
28/02/2007 Simon Plasmeijer Cab Kallas Web Feedback 
Question relating to the 
Transparency Initiative 
1/03/2007 Ana Zunic Siim Kallas 
Seminar Practice and Ethics of 
Lobbying 
6/03/2007 Schmidt Kristian SIMON@DIGISIMON.NL 
Question relating to the 
Transparency Initiative 
7/03/2007 Erik Wesselius Siim Kallas 
ALTER-EU letter on forthcoming 
Communication ont the 
European Transparency Initiative 
7/03/2007 Erik Wesselius - CEO Kristian Schmidt 
ETI and media attention for 
release of list Commission 
special advisers 
13/03/2007 Alter-EU Siim Kallas 
Meeting with representatives of 
Alter-EU 
19/03/2007 
Lyn Trytsman-Gray - 
President of SEAP 
Henrik Hololei 
European Transparency Initiative 
and Communication 
19/03/2007 Antonio Paiva - CoR Kristian Schmidt 
CoR opinion on the "European 
transparency initiative 
19/03/2007 Erik Wesselius - CEO Kristian Schmidt Can I call you today? 
23/03/2007 Daniel Guéguen - ETI Siim Kallas Book "European Lobbying" 
26/03/2007 
Joaquim Martins-Lampreia - 
Omniconsul 
Siim Kallas 
European Transparency 
Initiative/Portuguese 
Presidency/Lobbying 
27/03/2007 Kristian Schmidt 
Daniel Guéguen - European 
Training institute 
Thank you for the book 
"European Lobbying" 
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27/03/2007 Marco L. Sorgetti - CLECAT Kristian Schmidt Transparency Initiative 
28/03/2007 
Peter H. Voss - Club of 
Logistics 
Siim Kallas 
"Logistik - eine Industrie ohne 
Lobby?" 
29/03/2007 Helen O'Sullivan - SEAP Kristian Schmidt SEAP General Assembly 
30/03/2007 Christof Schramm Siim Kallas Lobbyist register 
3/04/2007 
Peter H. Voss - Club of 
Logistics 
Siim Kallas 
"Logistik - eine Industrie ohne 
Lobby?" 
4/04/2007 Raabe Beate - OGP EUROPE Kristian Schmidt Transparency and Lobbying 
4/04/2007 Joanna Benfield - AER Kristian Schmidt 
Regions and the European 
Transparency Initiative 
11/04/2007 Kristian Schmidt Peter H. Voss - Club of Logistics 
"Logistik - eine Industrie ohne 
Lobby?" 
11/04/2007 John Wyles - Interstate Siim Kallas 
Interstate Programmes N°8 - 
Brussels June 4-6 2007 
12/04/2007 Kristian Schmidt 
Joaquim Martins-Lampreia - 
Omniconsul 
Portugal Transparency  
12/04/2007 Jack Thurston Kristian Schmidt 
Beneficiaries of EU funds under 
central management 
15/04/2007 Fabian Bauwens Cab Kallas Web Feedback Lobbying within EU Institutions 
16/04/2007 Kristian Schmidt Antonio Paiva - CoR 
Thank you for CoR's opinion on 
ETI 
16/04/2007 Kristian Schmidt Christof Schramm Lobbyist register 
16/04/2007 Kristian Schmidt John Wyles - Interstate 
Interstate Programmes N°8 - 
Brussels June 4-6 2007 
17/04/2007 Kristian Schmidt Fabian Bauwens Lobbying within EU Institutions 
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18/04/2007 Jack Thurston Kristian Schmidt Transparency and CAP  
19/04/2007 Jose Lalloum - EPACA Kristian Schmidt 
Press release and possible quote 
from Commissioner Kallas 
24/04/2007 Henrik Fallesen Kristian Schmidt Fra DI/Transparens 
26/04/2007 EPACA - IPRA - SEAP Siim Kallas 
Core Principles for a Common 
Code of Conduct 
3/05/2007 Jose Lalloum - EPACA Siim Kallas EPACA RESPONSE TO ETI 
3/05/2007 
Christian D. de Fouloy - 
EULOBBY-NETWORK 
Siim Kallas EULOBBY - NETWORK 
9/05/2007 Erik Wesselius - CEO Kristian Schmidt 
For profit lobbyists challenge ETI 
financial transparency 
requirements 
9/05/2007 
Christian D. de Fouloy - 
EULOBBY-NETWORK 
Kristian Schmidt Historic Summit 
10/05/2007 Siim Kallas Jose Lalloum - EPACA EPACA RESPONSE TO ETI 
10/05/2007 
Lyn Trytsman-Gray - 
President of SEAP 
Siim Kallas 
Follow-up to the Green Paper on 
European Transparency Initiative 
14/05/2007 Kristian Schmidt Peter H. Voss - Club of Logistics 
"Logistik - eine Industrie ohne 
Lobby?" 
15/05/2007 
Craig Holman- Lobbyist 
Public Citizen 
Karen Campbell  Meeting request with Kallas 
15/05/2007 Georg Brodach Henrik Hololei Ravenstein Lunch May 31 , 2007 
20/05/2007 Siim Kallas 
Lyn Trytsman-Gray - President 
of SEAP 
Follow-up to the Green Paper on 
European Transparency Initiative 
22/05/2007 
Jean-François Bernardin - 
Président de l'ACFCI 
Siim Kallas 
communication COM(2007) 127 
Final Suivi du livre vert Initiative 
européenne en matière de 
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transparence 
25/05/2007 Kathryn Seren Craig Holman - Dr Thurber Visit to Brussels 24-30 june  
29/05/2007 
Pierre B. Meunier - Avocats 
Fasken 
Kristian Schmidt 
Ma visite à Bruxelles le 11 juin 
prochain 
30/05/2007 
Joaquim Martins-Lampreia - 
EULobby Portugal President 
Siim Kallas PTI - Portuguese Transparency  
11/06/2007 
Pierre Boulanger - Groupe 
d'économie mondiale at 
Sciences PO 
Kristian Schmidt 
Transparency in farms subsidies 
to French Farmers 
19/06/2007 Siim Kallas 
Jean-François Bernardin - 
Président de l'ACFCI 
communication COM(2007) 127 
Final Suivi du livre vert Initiative 
européenne en matière de 
transparence 
20/06/2007 
John Wilkinson - The Cinema 
Exhibitor's Association ltd 
Siim Kallas 
letter to VP Kallas from The 
Cinema Exhibitors' Assoc Ltd 
20/06/2007 Dominiek Meier - de ge pol Siim Kallas Volunteer register for lobbyists 
20/06/2007 
Catherine Stewart - Cabinet 
Stewart 
Kristian Schmidt SEAP's position on registration 
21/06/2007 
André De Schutter - 
President FAIB 
Siim Kallas Thank 
22/06/2007 
Arnaldo Abruzzini - 
Eurochambres 
Siim Kallas 
European Transparency 
Initiative: Comment from 
Eurochambres 
22/06/2007 Erik Wesselius - CEO Kristian Schmidt Some thoughts and a question 
27/06/2007 
Business Europe-Cefic-Copa-
Cogeca-UEAPME 
Siim Kallas 
Code of conduct for Interest 
representatives 
28/06/2007 Gérard Legris 
John Wilkinson - The Cinema 
Exhibitor's Association ltd 
Register of interest 
representatives 
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29/06/2007 
Marie José Grilo Rosa - 
Businesseurope 
Hanna Hinrikus - Kristian 
Schmidt 
European Transparency Initiative 
29/06/2007 John Vassallo - AMCHAM EU Siim Kallas 
INVITATION TO ADDRESS 
AmCham ON THE EUROPEAN 
TRANSPARENCY INITIATIVE 
2/07/2007 Kathryn Seren 
Marie José Grilo Rosa - 
Businesseurope 
European Transparency Initiative 
6/07/2007 Rudi Thomaes - FEB Siim Kallas 
Transparency initiative-Code of 
conduct and register 
7/07/2007 
Christian D. de Fouloy - 
EULOBBY-NETWORK 
Kristian Schmidt EPACA, SEAP 
9/07/2007 Siim Kallas John Vassallo - AMCHAM EU 
INVITATION TO ADDRESS 
AmCham ON THE EUROPEAN 
TRANSPARENCY INITIATIVE 
9/07/2007 Anne Jourdain - EUROCORD Siim Kallas + others 
Green paper on trade defence 
instruments - sollicitation of a 
meeting 
9/07/2007 
Ann-Katrin Bauknecht - 
President of FUECH 
Margus Rahuoja 
request for admission of the 
F.U.E.C.H. Association into the 
Data Bank of the European 
Commission 
9/07/2007 
Christian D. de Fouloy - 
AALEP 
Kristian Schmidt ETI 
11/07/2007 Siim Kallas 
Arnaldo Abruzzini - 
Eurochambres 
European Transparency 
Initiative: Comment from 
Eurochambres 
11/07/2007 Siim Kallas Dominiek Meier - de ge pol Volunteer register for lobbyists 
11/07/2007 Siim Kallas 
Business Europe-Cefic-Copa-
Cogeca-UEAPME 
Volunteer register for lobbyists 
“This is a post-peer-review, pre-copyedit version of an article published in Comparative 
European Politics. The definitive publisher-authenticated version Justin Greenwood (2011) 'The 
lobby regulation element of the European Transparency Initiative: between liberal and deliberative 
models of democracy', Comparative European Politics, 9, 3, pp317-343 doi:10.1057/cep.2010.18 is 
available online at: http://www.palgrave-journals.com/cep/journal/v9/n3/index.html 
©Justin Greenwood 
 26 
11/07/2007 Kathryn Seren Anne Jourdain - EUROCORD 
Green paper on trade defence 
instruments - sollicitation of a 
meeting 
11/07/2007 
Patrick Maison - 
Brusselsinternational 
Karen Campbell  
Doing Business in the European 
Union, Business Summit, 
Exhibitions and Events 
11/07/2007 Kathryn Seren 
Patrick Maison - 
Brusselsinternational 
Doing Business in the European 
Union, Business Summit, 
Exhibitions and Events 
16/07/2007 Kathryn Seren Olivier Bailly  
Letter to the Cabinet from 
F.U.E.C.H.  
24/07/2007 
Pearly Raynal - social 
platform 
Siim Kallas - Catherine Day 
european transparency initiative 
and beyond 
31/07/2007 
Christoph Köppchen - 
AMCHAM EU 
Kristian Schmidt 
AMCHAM EU RESPONSE TO 
FOLLOW-UP TO EUROPEAN 
TRANSPARENCY INITIATIVE 
3/08/2007 Siim Kallas Rudi Thomaes - FEB 
Transparency initiative-Code of 
conduct and register 
16/08/2007 
Hd. Herrn Bernd Dittmann 
BDI / BDA The German 
Business Representation 
SIIM KALLAS Transparency 
17/08/2007 Erik Wesselius - CEO Kristian Schmidt 
EPACA on collission course with 
Commission on ETI 
21/08/2007 Georg Plamen Kristian Schmidt 
Question from Prof. Plamen K. 
Georgiev - Freiburg / Germany 
21/08/2007 Erik Wesselius - CEO Kristian Schmidt 
BNA: US Lobbying bill means a 
"sea change" 
21/08/2007 Ulrich Tiburcy Kristian Schmidt Invitation 
23/08/2007 André De Schutter - siim kallas European transparency initiative 
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President FAIB 
23/08/2007 
Matt Rogerson - Senior 
Parliament Assistant  
Cab Kallas Web Feedback EU Lobbying regulation 
23/08/2007 Erik Wesselius - CEO Kristian Schmidt 
Advice on response to EPACA 
claims and questions? 
24/08/2007 
Joaquim Martins-Lampreia - 
Omniconsul 
Kristian Schmidt Event Transparency Lisbon 
27/08/2007 Siim Kallas 
Fintan Farrell - Roshan Di 
Puppo - Social Platform 
European transparency initiative 
and beyond 
31/08/2007 Siim Kallas 
André De Schutter - President 
FAIB 
European transparency initiative 
9/09/2007 Kristian Schmidt 
Hd. Herrn Bernd Dittmann BDI 
/ BDA The German Business 
Representation 
Transparency 
12/09/2007 
Jo Leinen - Committee on 
constitutional Affairs - the 
Chairman 
Siim Kallas Lobbyists 
13/09/2007 Siim Kallas 
Jo Leinen MEP- Committee on 
constitutional Affairs - the 
Chairman 
Lobbyists 
19/09/2007 Erik Wesselius - CEO Kristian Schmidt 
Kallas speech at AMCHAM and 
ETI implementation process 
19/09/2007 
Gergana Grancharova - 
Republic of Bulgaria - 
Minister for Foreign Affairs 
Siim Kallas Visit Bulgaria  
25/09/2007 
Albert Takacs - Minister of 
Justien and Law 
Enforcement Republic of 
Hungary 
Siim Kallas 
Invitation to the Conference 
entitled "How does the Lobby 
Act regulate Lobbying? 
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26/09/2007 Siim Kallas 
Albert Takacs - Minister of 
Justien and Law Enforcement 
Republic of Hungary 
Invitation to the Conference 
entitled "How does the Lobby 
Act regulate Lobbying? 
26/09/2007 Erik Wesselius - CEO Kristian Schmidt 
Kallas speech at AMCHAM and 
ETI implementation process 
1/10/2007 Dominiek Meier - de ge pol Kristian Schmidt 
European transparency initiative 
and Germany 
1/10/2007 
Andres Tupits - Legal 
Counsel 
Kristian Schmidt 
Standards of professional ethics 
for public office holders 
3/10/2007 
MEDEF - AFEP - Cercle de 
l'industrie 
Siim Kallas Livre vert sur la Transparence  
5/10/2007 Erik Wesselius - CEO Kristian Schmidt 
German industry statement on 
ETI 
10/10/2007 Dominiek Meier - de ge pol Kristian Schmidt degepol event Berlin 19 October 
16/10/2007 Uli Müller - Lobbycontrol Kristian Schmidt Lobbying in Germany 
17/10/2007 Siim Kallas 
Gergana Grancharova - 
Republic of Bulgaria - Minister 
for Foreign Affairs 
Visit Bulgaria 
17/10/2007 Siim Kallas 
MEDEF - AFEP - Cercle de 
l'industrie 
Livre vert sur la Transparence  
18/10/2007 
Christian D. de Fouloy - 
EULOBBY-NETWORK AISBL 
Siim Kallas - Hanna Hinrikus - 
Kristian Schmidt 
ELNET position paper 
24/10/2007 Kristian Schmidt 
Christian D. de Fouloy - 
EULOBBY-NETWORK AISBL 
ELNET position paper 
29/10/2007 Dominiek Meier - de ge pol Kristian Schmidt Mr. Kallas in Germany 
16/11/2007 Jose Lalloum - EPACA Siim Kallas 
Request for a meeting with 
Commissioner Kallas 
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16/11/2007 Erik Wesselius - CEO Kristian Schmidt 
Interview with José Lalloum in 
EurActiv 
20/11/2007 Kristian Schmidt Jose Lalloum - EPACA 
Request for a meeting with 
Commissioner Kallas 
27/11/2007 Erik Wesselius - CEO Kristian Schmidt Worst EU Lobby Award 
27/11/2007 Aive Levandi - Lhconcept Kristian Schmidt Lobbying in Estonia 
29/11/2007 Rudi Thomaes - FEB Siim Kallas Transparency initiative 
3/12/2007 Dominiek Meier - de ge pol Kristian Schmidt degepol statement 
3/12/2007 Mel Morris - Secretariat Cab Kallas Web Feedback 
Invitation to give a keynote 
presentation at the ESAE Annual 
Conference - Brussels 
3/12/2007 Dominiek Meier - de ge pol Kristian Schmidt degepol statement 
7/12/2007 Fabrizio Rovedi Cab Kallas Web Feedback European Transparency Initiative 
7/12/2007 Erik Wesselius - CEO Kristian Schmidt 
BBC documentary on EU NGO 
funding 
7/12/2007 
Paul de Clerck - Friends of 
the Earth Europe 
Kristian Schmidt press review 7-12-2007 
11/12/2007 
Christian D. de Fouloy - 
AALEP 
Kristian Schmidt Code of Conduct  
12/12/2007 Siim Kallas Dominiek Meier - de ge pol degepol statement 
12/12/2007 Siim Kallas Rudi Thomaes - FEB ETI 
20/12/2007 Kristian Schmidt Mel Morris - Secretariat 
Invitation to give a keynote 
presentation at the ESAE Annual 
Conference - Brussels 
20/12/2007 John Monks - ETUC - CES Siim Kallas Consultation sur le projet de 
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Code de déontologie pour les 
groupes d'intérêts 
21/12/2007 Jose Lalloum - EPACA Siim Kallas ETI - EPACA  
21/01/2008 Siim Kallas John Monks - ETUC - CES 
Consultation sur le projet de 
Code de déontologie pour les 
groupes d'intérêts 
25/01/2008 
Pekka Eskola - Political 
Assistant to MEP Anneli 
Jäätteenmäki 
Cab Kallas Web Feedback Meeting request 
28/01/2008 Carsten Vennemann - AIJA Siim Kallas AIJA Workshop 28 augustus 2008 
29/01/2008 Kristian Schmidt Carsten Vennemann - AIJA AIJA Workshop 28 augustus 2009 
30/01/2008 Kathryn Seren 
Pekka Eskola - Political 
Assistant to MEP Anneli 
Jäätteenmäki 
Meeting request 
1/02/2008 
Philippe de Buck - 
Businesseurope 
Siim Kallas 
BusinessEurope letter on draft 
code of conduct 
4/02/2008 
Gh. De Coninck - A. De 
Schutter - FAIB 
Siim Kallas 
Consultation "A code of conduct 
for interest representatives" 
5/02/2008 
Hd. Herrn Bernd Dittmann 
BDI / BDA The German 
Business Representation 
Siim Kallas Transparency 
6/02/2008 Markus Knigge - WWF Kristian Schmidt 
Disclosure of EFF Spending by 
Member States 
6/02/2008 Kristian Schmidt Markus Knigge - WWF 
Structural Funds article in 
Europolitics 14 january 
7/02/2008 Kristian Schmidt 
Gh. De Coninck - A. De Schutter 
- FAIB 
Consultation "A code of conduct 
for interest representatives" 
7/02/2008 Bankenverband Siim Kallas Kodex 
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8/02/2008 
E. Jonnaert - ECPA; Jose 
Lalloum - EPACA; Lyn 
trytsman-Gray - SEAP 
President Barroso, Poettering 
and Jansa 
Transparency 
11/02/2008 Siim Kallas Jose Lalloum - EPACA ETI - EPACA 
13/02/2008 Siim Kallas 
Philippe de Buck - 
Businesseurope 
BusinessEurope letter on draft 
code of conduct 
14/02/2008 Kristian Schmidt 
Hd. Herrn Bernd Dittmann BDI 
/ BDA The German Business 
Representation 
Transparency 
15/02/2008 Siim Kallas 
E. Jonnaert - ECPA; Jose 
Lalloum - EPACA; Lyn trytsman-
Gray - SEAP 
Transparency 
15/02/2008 Siim Kallas Manfred Weber  Kodex 
15/02/2008 
J. Creyssel - MEDEF; A. 
Tessier - AFEP; J. Leflon - 
Cercle de l'Industrie 
Siim Kallas Code de conduite  
27/02/2008 Christof Demmke - EIPA NL Kristian Schmidt 
Invitation for a conference on 
the practical management of 
Ethics on 9 and 10 June 2008 in 
Maastricht 
28/02/2008 
Carmen Wagner - 
Südwestrundfunk 
Cab Kallas Web Feedback - 
Valerie Rampi 
Interviewanfrage 
4/03/2008 Ruth Casals - ECCJ 
President Barroso; Siim Kallas; 
Margot Wallström 
lobbying transparency register 
5/03/2008 Siim Kallas 
J. Creyssel - MEDEF; A. Tessier - 
AFEP; J. Leflon - Cercle de 
l'Industrie 
Code de conduite 
11/03/2008 Erik Wesselius - ALTER EU Jose Manuel Barroso 
Can we expect an answer to our 
open letter of 13 February 
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12/03/2008 Michal Wiktorowicz - ISDA Cab Kallas Web Feedback 
Code of Conduct for Interest 
representatives 
13/03/2008 
Legrand Lydie - 
Europavertretung der 
Bundesagentur für Arbeit 
Cab Kallas Web Feedback 
Communication of the 
Commission regarding the 
transparency Initiative 
13/03/2008 Thomas Henöki - EIPA NL Kristian Schmidt 
Seminar Programme: Ethics and 
Integrity management in the 
Public Services 9 and 10 June 
2008 
14/03/2008 
Georges H. de Veirman - 
AECA 
Siim Kallas 
AECA Conference - Luncheon 
with Commissioner Siim Kallas  
14/03/2008 
Pekka Pesonen - COPA - 
COGECA 
Siim Kallas Code of conduct  
17/03/2008 
Cook Kyung-bok - The 
National assembly Budget 
Office Republic of Korea 
Kristian Schmidt Korea 
18/03/2008 
Etienne Douat - University of 
Montpellier 
Cab Kallas Web Feedback 
Initiative européenne pour la 
transparence 
19/03/2008 Síím Kallas  Erik Wesselius - ALTER EU Open letter of 13 February 
26/03/2008 Geoffrey Morbois Karen Campbell  Interview Lobbying 
28/03/2008 Kristian Schmidt 
Cook Kyung-bok - The National 
assembly Budget Office 
Republic of Korea 
Korea 
28/03/2008 Stella Brozek - FORATOM Kristian Schmidt 
Lobbyists' register and code of 
conduct 
31/03/2008 
EU Civil Society Contact 
Group 
Siim Kallas 
Implementation of European 
Commission Lobbying Register 
1/04/2008 Kathryn Seren Geoffrey Morbois Interview Lobbying 
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3/04/2008 Siim Kallas Ruth Casals - ECCJ lobbying transparency register 
3/04/2008 Bodo Lehmann Geoffrey Morbois Interview Lobbying 
3/04/2008 Kristian Schmidt Stella Brozek - FORATOM 
Lobbyists' register and code of 
conduct 
3/04/2008 G. Zadra; N. Jeanmart - EBIC Siim Kallas EBIC - request 
8/04/2008 
Georges H. de Veirman - 
AECA 
Siim Kallas Confirmation of Enrolment 
9/04/2008 Siim Kallas 
Rebecca Chen - University of 
California 
Interview Request with PhD 
9/04/2008 
Rebecca Chen - University of 
California 
Siim Kallas Interview Request with PhD 
9/04/2008 Gérard Legris 
Etienne Douat - University of 
Montpellier 
Réponse au professeur Douat 
10/04/2008 Jens Nymand-Christensen Stella Brozek - FORATOM 
European transparency initiative 
- Register and Code of conduct 
10/04/2008 Siim Kallas EU Civil Society Contact Group 
Implementation of European 
Commission Lobbying Register 
10/04/2008 Edite Melo Erik Wesselius - CEO 
Request for access to 
Commission documents relating 
to lobby contacts with regards to 
the ETI 
10/04/2008 Sandra Barghoorn - EUFIS Cab Kallas Web Feedback Question on ETI 
 Source: 
http://ec.europa.eu/commission_barroso/kallas/work/eu_transparency/correspon
dence_en.htm, last accessed on 22.3.2010, now archived. 
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1 Regulation (EC) No 1049/2001 of the European Parliament and of the 
Council regarding public access to European Parliament, Council and Commission documents 
2 http://www.archive.corporateeurope.org/barroso.html 
3 Kallas ‘Nottingham speech’, p.5.  This figure can be traced back to a similar figure stated in a European Parliament report in 
2003 (European Parliament, 2003), although the report itself did no more than assert this rather than providing a basis for its 
calculation.  These figures have entered into folklore as a result of the frequency with which they have been quoted.  When 
challenged on the 15,000 figure, a Commission spokesperson responded by stating that it was an estimate produced by an 
external source, and that Commissioner Kallas had always declared the figure as estimated (see 
http://www.euractiv.com/en/pa/eu-lobbyists-scramble-exact-numbers/article-173152).   
4 http://euobserver.com/?aid=18597&rk=1 
5 An (undated, estimated 2007) ALTER-EU brochure describing itself and its work lists CEO as its contact address.  In a March 7 
2007 correspondence item (see endnote 9) Wesselius writes to Kallas ‘On behalf of the ALTER-EU’ Steering Committee’. 
6 P de Clerck (2007) ‘A Matter of Interest’, Public Affairs News, March, p.33 
7 http://ec.europa.eu/commission_barroso/kallas/doc/eti/07a408.tif 
8 ALTER-EU (undated, c.2007) ‘The Alliance for Lobbying Transparency and Ethics Regulation’, unpaginated.  The quote appears 
on the penultimate portfolio. 
9 http://ec.europa.eu/commission_barroso/kallas/work/eu_transparency/correspondence_en.htm.  The correspondence was 
last accessed on 22.3.2010, but was archived alongside other web pages of the Barroso 1 Commission in spring 2010, which has 
the effect of removing them from public view.  The author holds a copy of this correspondence for inspection; a list of it as it 
appeared on Europa is here included in the Appendix.  
10 See, for instance, the Society of European Affairs Practitioners (SEAP) response to the European Commission Communication 
follow up to the Green Paper ‘European Transparency Initiative’, http://www.seap.eu.org/linkdocs/ETI_position_paper.pdf 
accessed on 14 July 2010 
11 such as Nokia, still unregistered after two years of operation of the register, despite being highly active on the Brussels scene. 
12 The category of registration selected in the European Public Affairs Directory 2007, rather than the available alternative 
‘interest groups.’ 
13 http://ec.europa.eu/commission_barroso/kallas/speeches_articles/speeches_archives_en.htm accessed on 14 July 2010.  
See, in particular, the speeches to the European Public Affairs Consultancies Association (25.01.2006) 
http://ec.europa.eu/commission_barroso/kallas/doc/speech_250106_en.pdf accessed on 14 July 2010; the Society of 
European Affairs Practitioners (23.04.2007) http://ec.europa.eu/commission_barroso/kallas/doc/speech_230407_en.pdf’ 
accessed on 14 July 2010;  
and the speech to the EU Committee of the American Chamber of Commerce (AMCHAM-EU) on 18.9.2007, 
http://europa.eu/rapid/pressReleasesAction.do?reference=SPEECH/07/544&format=HTML&aged=0&language=EN&guiLangua
ge=en accessed on 14 July 2010. 
14 On 6 July 2010 
15 http://www.epha.org/a/3247 accessed on 5 July 2010 
16 http://euobserver.com/9/27602 accessed on 6 July 2010 
17 http://www.euractiv.com/en/pa/chemicals-group-suspended-eu-lobby-register/article-184291 accessed on 7 July 2010 
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18 such as ‘other/other organisations’ 
19.  Some revisions to spending disclosure guidelines were made in the October 2009 review for the category of public affairs 
practitioners (European Commission, 2009)).  
20 http://www.euractiv.com/en/pa/transparency-initiative/article-140650 accessed on 7 July 2010 
21 See, for instance, the 1992 policy paper from the Secretariat of the European Commission, ‘An open and structured dialogue 
between the Commission and special interest groups’ at http://ec.europa.eu/civil_society/interest_groups/docs/v_en.pdf 
accessed on 14 July 2010; and the statement by Kallas in 2007 at 
http://europa.eu/rapid/pressReleasesAction.do?reference=SPEECH/07/544&format=HTML&aged=0&language=EN&guiLangua
ge=en, accessed 14 July 2010. 
22 See the responses of these organisations to the Commissions consultation on consultation standards, at 
http://ec.europa.eu/civil_society/consultation_standards/histo_en.htm, accessed 14 July 2010. 
23 https://webgate.ec.europa.eu/transparency/regrin/infos/codeofconduct.do. 
24 https://webgate.ec.europa.eu/transparency/regrin/infos/codeofconduct.do, accessed 14 July 2010. 
25 http://www.ingoaccountabilitycharter.org/, accessed 14 July 2010. 
26 http://www.thecompact.org.uk/information/100022/101508/101517/theconsultationandpolicyappraisalcode/., accessed 14 
July 2010.   ‘Compacts’ are public statements of commitments to standards which generally (though not always) fall short of 
legal status.  
27 http://www.oneworldtrust.org, accessed  14 July 2010. 
